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THE ILLUSION OF AIR LINE SUBSIDY
By CARLETON PUTNAM
Chairman of the Board, founder and formerly President of Chicago
and Southern Air Lines, Princeton B.S., Columbia LL.B. Author of
"High Journey-A Decade in the Pilgrimage of an Air Line Pioneer"
and numerous papers dealing with the social aspects of air transpor-
tation.
N O phantom of the public imagination is more easy to understand,
more difficult to combat, and yet more essentially false, than the
illusion of air line subsidy. It haunts the halls of Congress, stalks
through the press, directs the pen of scholars, and beguiles the hurried
thoughts of the average man. In a recent issue of this JOURNAL an
elaborate structure of analysis was built in its name,' starting with an
assumption on which all else depended but which was never itself
examined. The purpose of this article is to examine it, and to provide
an amulet for readers who would be defended against such phantoms
in the future.
Let us begin by realizing that there are those who have much to
gain when the ghost walks and who struggle artfully for its perpetua-
tion. The railroads, having received more than six times the "subsidy"
attributed to the air lines, and the water carriers, having had twelve
times as much,2 find nothing graceless in conjuring it to rise beside the
cradle of the infant brother. The bootleg air lines - and by bootleg air
lines are meant operators who hold themselves out to the public as air
lines but to the law as sometHing else- partake in the ritual. And
there are among the scheduled carriers a few large companies that
eschewed pointing at shadows in their younger days but see nothing
Punic in pointing to them now when doing so may serve to embarrass
or destroy competitors.
These groups have on their side the increasing tendency of Govern-
ment officials to be so harassed with a variety of problems that no time
remains for a careful study of any, together with what Clifton Fadiman
has called "the decline of attention" on the part of the public in recent
decades to matters requiring self-induced cerebration. The writer will
try to adapt himself to these conditions but begs the reader to remem-
ber that the nature of the subject precludes his doing so completely.
1 M. George Goodrick, Air Mail Subsidy of Commercial Aviation, 16 J. Air L.
& Com. 253 (1949).
2 For studies on this subject developed by the writer, see Hearings before the
Committeo on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. Senate, 81st Congress, 1st




It will be helpful to start with an analogy which may at first seem an
over-simplification but which contains all the essentials of the matter.
Each morning a postman brings letters to a residence and for this serv-
ice receives a salary. No one has thought of calling the salary a subsidy.
But upon a certain morning the' householder at the residence makes the
postman a proposition. If the postman will stop on his route at the
neighborhood grocery and bring the householder's daily groceries with
the mail, the householder will undertake to pay the postman a certain
sum for his trouble. This proposition the postman accepts, with the
proviso that he will deduct the certain sum from' his salary, thereby
reducing the cost to the Post Office of delivering the letters. Is it now
proper to say that the postman's salary has become a subsidy? Rather
does it not seem that the postman has done something on behalf of the
Government which makes the transaction the diametric opposite? Has
he not reduced the expense of a service which otherwise would have
cost the Government more to the exact extent of the householder's con-
tribution?
The analogy'to the relation between the air lines and the Post Office
is complete in every respect. There is no difference in any essential fac-
tor save that the Government itself urged upon the "postman" and the
"householder" the cost-reducing transaction. The first air mail was car-
ried by the Government in Government mail planes. Then the Gov-
ernment made contracts with private individuals to carry the mail.
Thereafter it became the practice for these contractors to carry passen-
gers also, and they were urged to do so by the Government, in order to
reduce the cost of carrying the mail. At no time was this thought of as
a subsidy, any more than the payment of a letter or rural-free-delivery
carrier's salary was thought of as a subsidy. Why, then, and at what
point, does the further development of the passenger business turn the
payment for carriage of air mail into a subsidy?
It is this writer's belief that nowhere in the annals of government
can there be found a more skillful device, a more thorough procedure,
to protect the federal treasury against any jot of subsidy to the air lines
than that contained in Sec. 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act. The
whole effort of a five-man judicial board and a staff of hundreds is bent
to the task of draining out the last possible penny of payment to any air
line over and above the clearly, honestly, and efficiently incurred costs
of carrying the mail, minus the net income from other sources which
the Board demands the air line cultivate as diligently as it cultivates
economy of operations. It is as if a Board were set up to supervise
every activity of our postman, to make sure all possible groceries were
carried, that all receipts from this source were deducted from salary,
and that any claims for larger mail sacks were carefully scrutinized.
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GENESIS OF THE ILLUSION
At this point, the victims of the subsidy illusion customarily answer
that we are regarding the form rather than the substance, that the air
lines have long since passed beyond the letter-carrier stage and must be
treated as we now treat the railroads, that commercial business is the
primary business of the air lines and the mail a minor matter,3 and that
there is no distinction in substance between land-grant aids to the rail-
roads in the mid-nineteenth century, or other Government subsidies,
and the aid channelled through mail payments to the air lines.
Let us consider this answer sympathetically. If subsidy starts at a
certain place on the scale of relative volume, how do we logically find
it? Is it at 40% or 50% or 60% or 90% or 73% of passenger-load pre-
dominance? We cannot come to allocated cost devices yet, nor until we
transform the postman into something else. Do we accomplish this by
legislative fiat, and if so, what principles guide the legislators? Is it a
"judgment figure"? Can certified public accountants settle it, or shall
we call in management engineers? If a Yale lawyer says it is a matter of
route segment analysis, and a Harvard Business School study indicates it
is a question of air line systems, shall we call in arbitrators or refer the
issue to the circuit court?
A moment's consideration should reveal the hopelessly unscientific
nature of this approach, the hit-or-miss thinking it involves, and we be-
gin to understand why the matter today is in such confusion. Clarifica-
tion begins with definition, and before we proceed further, it may be
wise to attempt a definition of subsidy. The following is offered as rea-
sonable: a subsidy is the tendering of something for less than its eco-
nomic equivalent at the time of the transaction. Consider the railroad
land grants. Millions of acres of land were tendered the railroads,
without any regard to the immediate cost of railroad building or opera-
tion, for the sake of the long-term development of the country. No one
disputes the policy. But there was no economic or other equivalent at
the time of the transaction. Hence we rightly refer to this as a subsidy.
Or consider the carriage of second-class mail for less than the cost of the
service. There is no economic equivalent for this, either at the time of
the transaction or later. So, clearly, this is a subsidy. Or take the pay-
ment to farmers of a support price for surplus food. Here something is
tendered which is more than the economic equivalent of what is re-
ceived, now or later. All these things fall easily within the scope of our
definition.
But what of mail payments to the air lines? Here the Post Office
Department pays the carriers, on an account-rendered basis, for services
already performed at a price fixed by the CAB as the filtered equivalent
of the actual cost of carrying the mail, reduced by the extent to which
s But we cannot overlook the fact that for every user of the non-mail
services there are fifty users of the mail service. From the point of view of a
democracy, when the diffusion of the use is considered against dead weight in the
planes, the mail service is fifty times more important than the other services.
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the income from other services exceeds the added cost of producing it.
This,'if anything, is the subsidy process in reverse. The Post Office
pays less than it would be compelled to pay under any other circum-
stances - half to three-quarters what it would pay if it carried the mail
in its own mail planes.4 Clearly, the quid pro quo is "at the time of the
transaction." The only area of possible debate revolves around the is-
sue of "economic" equivalence, and it is here we come to grips with the
phantom in its most seductive form.
The Allocated Cost Approach
For, at this point, the accountants enter with formulas they habitu-
ally apply to open commercial transactions, the most insidious of which
is the concept of allocated costs. On an air line, this concept consists of
removing from the carrier's expenses all direct costs possibly attribu-
table to other services and then dividing the remaining costs in the ratio
the ton-miles of mail carried bear to the ton-miles in other service.
The result as to mail is then called "the cost of carrying the mail," and
any further payment needed to keep the carrier in business, after his
other income is considered, is called "subsidy." There may be some
minor variations in the concept, a soupcon may be added for serving
small towns, and a je ne sais quoi for operations after midnight, but by
and large we can safely refer to the concept as the ton-mile allocation
approach and the result, in the minds of the accountants, as the true
cost of carrying the mail.
But now we face an enigma. Let us illustrate it by a simple case.
Suppose we apply the ton-mile allocation approach to a certain air line
and discover that the "cost" of carrying the mail is 100 and of the other
services 90¢. But the income obtainable from the other services does
not, and cannot, approach 90. Consequently, unless the *mail pays
more than 10¢, nothing moves - there is no service, no mail is carried.
Under these circumstances, how can 10€ be said to represent the true
cost of carrying the mail? If it did, the mail could move. Can it be pos-
sible to pay the true cost of moving something and yet have it remain
economically impossible to move it? Obviously, we cannot arrive at
the true cost of carrying the mail until it becomes economically possible-
to move the mail, and this point cannot be reached until the gap be-
tween the non-mail revenues and the totalI cost is closed.
Or let us approach the subject from the opposite angle. Eliminat-
ing legal restrictions that do not bear upon the issue, let us assume an
air line operator, confronted by an allocation formula that stigmatizes
part of his mail pay as subsidy, wishes to avoid the stigma. Accord-
ingly, he discontinues everything except his mail service. Immediately
all his costs must be allocated to carrying the mail, so the subsidy disap-
pears. But the cost to the Government increasesl Can something be a
subsidy at 10€ a mile, and not a subsidy at 200? Again, obviously not.
4 The writer makes the assumption, he believes properly for the purpose of
this discussion, that the public would be entitled to a reasonable replica of the
mail service it presently enjoys as regards both speed and frequency.
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The ton-mile allocation concept collapses for the very reason that
there is no economic equivalence between payment on an allocated cost
basis and the service actually rendered. Equivalence is not reached un-
til payment and true cost are in balance. Ton-mile allocated cost is not
true cost - if it were, movement of the mail would be economically pos-
sible. The true cost is found when, by its payment, movement can be-
gin. And, by definition, the payment of true cost cannot be subsidy.
Broadening the Analysis
It follows that the analysis must be broadened to make sure the serv-
ice could not be obtained more cheaply and as adequately by other
means. This includes making certain first that the cost of the ancillary
services is covered by their income, and secondly that no other form or
vehicle of transportation can duplicate the end result for less money.
It is clear, for example, that it would be cheaper for the Post Office to
carry first-class mail by truck than to support a railroad system stripped
of all other functions than the carriage of mail and, consequently, if the
Government were to undertake to close the gap between mail and non-
mail revenues on the rails, this would be a subsidy. But it is equally
clear both that the ancillary services more than cover their added cost in
the air and that it would not be cheaper for the Government to fly mail
otherwise than in a skeletonized air line service, if the standard service
were not available.5
Let us beware here of falling into any fallacies as regards the passen-
ger business. We have seen that the allocated cost theory fails because,
except in the most isolated cases, the cost assigned to the mail on a ton-
mile allocation basis prohibits a transaction. But it does not follow
that when, on the same basis, the passenger is charged less, he is subsi-
dized. The Government pays nothing additional to or for the move-
ment of the passenger. It gains by his movement. We cannot classify
as subsidy a transaction which not only does not involve any additional
payment but actually saves the Government money.
A clearer view of this situation will be obtained if we refer again to
our definition of subsidy. It may seem at first blush as if the passenger
were being tendered something for less than its economic equivalent,
but note that the basic tender is to the user of the air mail service and
that the only tender to the passenger is the tender of the added service
for which the passenger pays more than the added cost.6 The same rea-
5 To put the point another way, if the non-mail revenues of the railroads pay
only their added costs, the remaining plant is out of all proportion to the needs
of the mail service, whereas when the non-mail services of the air lines pay their
added cost, the remaining plant is essential to the air mail service.6 Note further that the only tender the Government makes is to the user of
the air mail service, that the tender to the passenger is made by the air line,
which initiates all price and service controls bearing upon this transaction, pro-
vides at its own discretion the added service, and for it charges the passenger
more than the added cost. The Government tenders nothing to the passenger in
the legal sense, and nothing in the economic sense which it has not already been
compelled to tender in toto to the user of the air mail service in the initial
transaction.
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soning is applicable to the user of air freight and air express. All of
these services might perhaps be regarded as ancillary parasites upon the
tender to the user of the air mail service, but not as objects of subsidy
themselves. Even as parasites their nature is peculiar, for they give
while they gain.
SUBSIDY TO AIR MAIL USERS
The major point has now begun to emerge. If we assume that the
Post Office Department's Cost Ascertainment Report is based on sound
principles of accounting, we find the Government suffering a net loss on
the operation of the air mail service; Somebody must be subsidized.
Who is it?
In such a situation, it would seem only natural to suspect that the
subsidy in the case might be to the users of air mail. And applying the
tools already developed it becomes plain that the only party to whom
something is being tendered for less than its economic equivalent at the
time of the transaction is the purchaser of the air mail stamp. The air
lines are no more involved in this subsidy than are the workmen who
build the house a man gives to his son. The man pays the workmen,
but the gift is to the son. No other gift is involved.7
This illuminating fact has a decisive bearing upon the whole air
line controversy. One cannot segregate a subsidy to the air lines when
the subsidy is to someone else. The place to segregate a subsidy is in
the spot where it occurs. If the subsidy is to the users of the air mail
service, the place to study it, and to segregate it, is not in the accounting
offices of the air lines, or in the CAB, but in the Post Office Department.
The payments to the air lines, like the wages to the workmen, need be
considered only once, and for what they are, as an element of true cost
to which is added a proration of the Post Office Department's overhead,
the sum then being balanced against the income from air mail postal
revenues. If the result is a deficit, the deficit is the measure of the sub-
sidy. Air line studies and cost allocations become meaningless.
Significance of the Distinction
Once this truth is accepted, the weary years and the useless expendi-
ture of money and energy that would otherwise go to the futile effort to
materialize a phantom are forestalled. But it seems as if the truth
dawns on the victims of the illusion in two stages. The first comes with
the realization that the. subsidy is to the users of the air mail service, the
7 Although the Chairman of the CAB appears at the moment to have taken
inconsistent positions in the matter, the following extract from his testimony
before the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee is of interest:
Mr. O'Connell: ". . . It may be well to point out that provided the carrier's
management is honest, economical and efficient, the payment by the Government
of the amount necessary to meet the needs of the carrier and to furnish it with
a return on its investment is not a subsidy to the carrier. Rather it is a subsidy
to the persons who use the air service ......
Senator Tobey: "Pardon me for interrupting you. I was interested in that
last qualification about its being a subsidy for the public. Of course it is. .. ."
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second when the significance of this fact is appreciated. One must
guard against the assumption that a subsidy to the users of air mail and
a subsidy to the air lines are in any way related as far as segregation, or
anything else, is concerned. Government officials appear at times
reluctantly to accept the true nature of the subsidy, while still pressing
for some sort of mail pay segregation, a position which a moment's
thought will show to be untenable. If the subsidy is to the users of the
air mail service, all mail payments to the air lines are true cost pay-
ments and there is nothing to be segregated.
The following equations may assist in making this point clear. If R
- air mail postal revenues, C = air line costs, 0 = prorated Post Office
Department overhead, and SI = subsidy to the users of the air mail
service, then
(C + o) - R = Sl (1)
For the purpose of this equation, air line costs and air line mail rates
must be considered synonymous, so that the equation may finally be
written
(M + 0) -R=SI (2)
where M equals the total mail payments to the air carriers.
This equation bears no relation whatever to any equation that
might be written under the air line subsidy illusion. Such an equation
would necessarily read
C- (Rn + Ac) = S2 (3)
where C equals the total costs of any air line, Rn - non-mail air line
revenues, Ac - the ton-mile allocated cost of carrying the mail, and S2
= subsidy to the air line. This equation is sterile because, as we have
seen, Ac does not represent true cost in the majority of situations.
When it does, S2 disappears, since in such situations the terms must be
related by
C > Rn + Ac (4)
In any case, the absurdity of assuming identity in the two equations (2)
and (3), which have only ohe out of four terms in common, is obvious.
RELATED MISCONCEPTIONS
One may wonder at the slow and painful release of the mind from
the enslavement of the air line subsidy illusion until one remembers the
desperate purpose of those who seek to perpetuate it. Once this illu-
sion goes, the way is open for the collapse of the whole fabric of fantasy
that has been erected by the enemies of the air lines since the war, un-
der cover of which every conceivable means has been takento embar-
rass air line managements, stigmatize air line mail pay, and otherwise
discount the achievements of air transportation. Magazine and news-
paper articles have poured in a flood from the presses of the country,
editorials have followed, commentators have joined the chorus, all
8
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deploring the financial weakness of the air lines, their heavy subsidy,
their bewildered managements, and their "increasing dependence on
Government." In consequence, air line stocks have crashed on the ex-
changes, and the general impression prevails that the air lines are a sick,
sore, and sorry segment of the economy."
This is precisely what the surface transportation interests want. It
perfectly suits the purpose of the bootleg air lines. A few large legiti-
mate carriers see in such chaotic thinking the possibility of loot among
the smaller scheduled companies. To dispel these fantasies must be for
them an irreparable unmasking. Almost anything is worth doing to
perpetuate them, regardless of the dishonesty involved.
And much dishonesty has been involved. He who wakes from the
dream of air line subsidy will be amazed at the extent of his misleading.
Laying aside the question of subsidy itself, let us consider just a few of
the collateral deceits:
1. Instead of an "increasing dependence on Government," the
fact is that the air lines in the last ten years have achieved a 65%
reduction in their charge to the Government for the carriage of the
mails.9
2. Instead of profligacy of management, the fact is that the air
lines in the last ten years have cut seat-mile costs in half. 10
3. Instead of a burden to the taxpayer, the fact is that the air
lines through the air mail service have, up to 1948, earned back for
the taxpayer $54,000,000 more than the true added costs 11 of the
service to the Post Office Department. Since the overhead would
have had to continue in any case, the taxpayer at the time of the
study was $54,000,000 ahead in cash because of the air mail service.
4. Instead of a relatively costly subsidy to the air lines, the fact
is that the actual subsidy to users of the air mail, including Post
Office Department prorates, has amounted in thirty years to about
half what the subsidy to the users of second-class mail amounts to
in one year.'
2
s Other contributing factors to this misconception have been considered by
the writer in the Winter 1949 issue of AIR AFFAIRS, pp. 491-492.
9 Adjusted for the change in the value of the dollar.
10 Idem.
11 By added costs are meant not simply "direct" costs, or costs allocated under
the Act of June 9, 1930; the writer, with the help of the Cost Ascertainment Di-
vision of the Post Office Department, has screened all overhead of the Department
and retained every expense which by any possibility might not have been incurred
if there had never been an air mail service. See S. Res. 50, Part 1 of Hearings,
pp. 458-461, Part 3, pp. 1340-1342.
12 Idem, Part 3 of Hearings, pp. 1318-1319. Here the Postmaster General
says: "As shown in the statistical exhibits attached to this statement, the total
deficit incurred from the inauguration of the first air mail service in 1918 up to
the close of the fiscal year 1948 amounts to $107,439,430 for both the foreign and
domestic service. This may be regarded as an investment over the 30-year period."
On page 1296, he says: "The present (annual) subsidy on second-class mail is
about $207,000,000. The present (annual) subsidy on third-class mail is about
$139,000,000. The present (annual) subsidy on the penny postal card is about $57,-
000,000. The present (annual) subsidy on fourth-class mail is about $82,000,000.
.. So far as the financial condition of the postal service is concerned, the so-called
air mail subsidy is the least subsidy we have."
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The record on these points alone surpasses beyond doubt the record
of any other form of transportation in the history of this country or the
world. Neither the railroads nor the water carriers can touch it. As
the phantom retreats into the shadows and the truth dawns upon the
mind, the shameful misrepresentations and the outright calumny vis-
ited upon the air transport industry since the war are disclosed. It is a
question which is the more shocking - the traducement of the air lines
or the gullibility of the public, the press, and the Congress 's in their
acceptance of the defamation. Any fair-minded examination of the
record will reveal an achievement worthy of the highest praise by any
standards. That the air lines for so long have been tendered just the
opposite will remain one of the paradoxes of history.
ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC OFF-SETS TO THE AIR MAIL SUBSIDY
Because of its many non-economic aspects and the difficulty of close
statistical analysis, the contribution of the air lines to the national de-
fense has thus far been omitted from this paper. But in evaluating the
economic offsets to the public of the relatively small subsidy to the users
of air mail, it cannot be entirely ignored. The writer is authorized by
the Office of Public Information, Headquarters Military Air Transport
Service, to quote the following statement:
Direct relationships between the civil air carriers and MATS
are always misleading because the function of the civil carriers is
to provide commercial airlift, whereas the function of MATS is to
maintain a nucleus prepared for great expansion to meet military
requirements in time of war. In peace-time, MATS military airlift
is only a by-product in MATS preparedness for war. Both the civil
operators and MATS intend that their combined resources shall be
used to the best national advantage in time of war. Today the com-
bined resources of both are short of the war requirement. Conse-
quently, if there were no civil airlines in operation, there would
obviously be a very great increase in the military budget required
to replace the war potential represented by the civil capacity.
The exact amount of such increase, either percentage wise or on
a dollar basis, is impossible to estimate because the total absence of
the civil airlines would affect far more than the air transport func-
tions of the Military Air Transport Service and the other military
agencies equipped with transport aircraft.
The cost of MATS air transport functions during the fiscal year
1949 was $82,527,051. As of 31 October 1949 there were 263 major
transport aircraft (C-46, C-47, C-54, C-74, C-82, C-97, C-118 and
C-121) assigned to the Air Transport Division of the Military Air
Transport Service.
For comparative purposes it may be noted that the commercial air
lines of the United States maintain a fleet of 1083 planes of equivalent
13 The Appropriations Committees of Congress 'decry the "increasing appro-
priations for air mail," but mention is never made of the fact that the Post Office
today, by comparison with pre-war years, is getting five times the mail carried
for only three times the money, while paying twice the pre-war price for everything
else. Nor is mention made of the subsidy to second, third, or fourth-class mail, or
rural free delivery, or the penny postcard.
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categories in constant activity, with a full complement of pilots and
mechanics. The reader may estimate for himself the extent of the "very
great increase in the military budget required to replace the war poten-
tial represented by the civil capacity" by relating 263 planes to 1083'
planes, and $82,527,051 to his estimate. The approach is rough but
suggestive. The figure may then be placed beside the $27,000,000 an-
nual subsidy currently assigned to the air mail service by the Post Office
Department.
Another factor difficult of analysis is the dollar value of the time
saved to the passengers of the air lines by comparison with travel by
rail. Studies 14 have been undertaken in this area on the assumption
that the average air line passenger earns a salary of $4,000 annually, and
preliminary results indicate a total saving to the national economy of
not less than $130,000,000 a year, after allowance has been made for the
added cost of the air ticket.
Perhaps no contribution to the general welfare has had larger sig-
nificance or received less attention than this subject. The writer be-
lieves Mr. Bennett deserves great credit for introducing it to research
workers in the field of air line economics. It embraces a concept, how-
ever, which extends beyond the range of economics and is succinctly ex-
pressed by the phrase, "making a neighborhood of the nation."
Countless social gains are involved when horizons are at once made
broader and more accessible. Many of the gains can be expressed in
monetary terms, but many cannot.
CONCLUSION
By way, then, of summation, we find an air transport industry re-
quired by law to earn every cent of the pay it receives from the Govern-
ment in the performance of a function involving a subsidy to the users
of air mail of some $27,000,000 a year. By comparison, the subsidy to
second-class mail is $207,000,000, to third-class mail $139,000,000, to
fourth-class mail $82,000,000, and to the penny postcard $57,000,000.
The cost of rural free delivery cannot be estimated. As immediate eco-
nomic offsets to the subsidy to the users of air mail are the factors men-
tioned in the preceding paragraphs, plus the intangible value of
developing a new transport industry of incalculable future possibilities.
Reference has already been made to the relative status of air trans-
port in American transportation history, as regards both payments re-
ceived from, and speed and quantity of earnbacks to, the Government.",
We have seen that the cost, to the Government of carrying the mails has
declined 65% in the last ten years and that the peacetime trend has been
steadily downward, so that within the foreseeable future the air lines
may be earning a profit for the Government on the air mail service.
14 Analysis begun by J. Bennett of Washington, D.C.
15 S. Res. 50, Part 1 of Hearings, pp. 456-466, 486-487.
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The Essential Question
In the face of these various factors, the question inevitably must be
asked: What justification exists for the current rash of investigations
and proposed changes in the Civil Aeronautics Act? One can under-
stand a desire to change a law when results under it have been doubtful.
It is hard to understand such a desire when results have been superla-
tively good. Can the taxpayer or the industry afford a Roman holiday
every few years for the eager young men on the staffs of Government
commissions and committees, ably assisted by interests which stand to
gain by disruption? The interminable analyses and re-analyses of air
line accounts and statistics by Government bodies, permanent and tem-
porary, are expensive to both the industry and the taxpayer..
Moreover, most of the proposed new legislation would tend to make
the temporary analyses permanent. For example, while the writer can-
not see how, by any stretch of the imagination, Government payments
to the air lines can ever be termed subsidy, other approaches to these
payments may, be rationalized which would still involve cost allocations.
It is the writer's opinion, after fifteen years of experience with the keep-
ing of air line accounts, statistics, and other records for the Govern-
ment, that further to complicate the existing requirements would be,
more time-consuming and expensive than could be justified by any con-
ceivable benefit to be expected from it. It is suggested to men and
women, whether in the Government, in universities or elsewhere, who
wish to exercise their wits and social theories on experimental legisla-
tion, that they do so otherwise than at the expense of a successful indus-
try and a successful Act.
It is also devoutly to be hoped that the dispelling of the illusion of
air line subsidy, the envisioning of whatever subsidy exists as a subsidy
to the users of the air mail service, the significance of this distinction,
and the minor nature of the air mail subsidy in relation to other subsi-
dies may commence a process which will purge the public consciousness
of the countless collateral fallacies grown in the rank shadows of the ma-
jor phantom. Such a purge is long overdue. Noticeable damage has
been done the industry and its stockholders, its personnel and all who
dedicated themselves to its future at the close of the war. The temper
of management has become restrictive, the confidence of investors has
been undermined, and the morale of employees has been lowered.
This is not only an unsuitable reward to. visit upon air transport but an
unwholesome atmosphere in which to expect any pioneer enterprise to
progress. The air lines of the United States have done their fair share
in the public interest, and will continue to do so if the public is fair to
them.
